Supranational solidarity has not proven to be necessarily effective in overcoming the lack of convergence of interests between the Member States in areas which are sovereign sensitive, or to be capable of doing so in a way that upholds EU principles. Intergovernmental solidarity in the implementation of the policy is functionally driven and progressively characterised by EU norms and procedures, but it is unlikely that the search for effectiveness will lead to the supranationalisation of this sovereign sensitive field.
INTRODUCTION
focusing the EU's strategy in response to the refugee crisis on strengthening EU external border controls and externalizing refugee protection and migration management through cooperation with third countries.
A third, more identity-driven, notion of solidarity has also emerged. This notion advocates a less state-centred, less securitised and less exclusionary understanding of solidarity by requiring greater focus on the individual. 17 The inclusion of a rights-based approach dimension into solidarity is seen as required by the EU fundamental rights protection framework. 18 This understanding of solidarity advocates, for example, the introduction of secondary free movement rights for refugees in the EU. 19 It has also found expression in calls by the European Parliament for a more holistic response to the refugee crisis which should include elements of 'external' solidarity in the form for example of humanitarian visas. 
INDIVIDUAL-FOCUSED SOLIDARITY IN VISA POLICY
Visa policy is a field where individual-focused solidarity, in the form, for example, of a system of EU humanitarian visas, is entirely absent. This is a consequence of the division of competence on visas between the EU and the Member States, the unclear scope of the fundamental rights protection framework applicable to visas in general, and the lack of political readiness. Indeed, while it is widely recognised that state discretion to control entry into state territory is limited by human rights obligations, as clearly reflected in provisions of EU external border control instruments, the applicability of such obligations to extra-territorial settings, such as visa issuing in third countries, is highly contested, although certainly not excluded altogether. 21 In particular, it is generally submitted by commentators that Article 3 ECHR requires Contracting States to grant visas through their diplomatic representations to applicants in specific circumstances, particularly as the ECtHR has identified as instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State covered by the ECHR 'cases involving the activities of its diplomatic and consular agents abroad'. 22 However, the question remains ultimately unanswered and may be further complicated in practice by trends such as extensive reliance by states on external service providers in the visa issuing process.
In X and X v Belgium the Court of Justice had the opportunity to clarify the scope of the common visa policy and the consequent application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose implementation, unlike Article 3 ECHR, does not depend on the exercise of jurisdiction but indeed on the application of EU law. 23 The Court, departing from the opinion of the been criticised as unsound and revealing of the existence of political considerations behind the judgement. 27 The Court's central argument, on the other hand, appears technically convincing, but not necessarily unavoidable. In particular, the Court skilfully highlighted the distinction between the purpose of a visa application, which may take it outside the scope of the Visa Code, and the implementation of the grounds for refusing a uniform visa (including the existence of doubts as to the applicant's intention to leave the relevant Member State before the expiry of the visa) which does not have that effect. 28 24 Ibid., para 43-45; Article 1(1). 25 Ibid. 26 While individual-centred solidarity seems consequently absent from visa policy, it remains true that the policy, since communitarisation, has been increasingly characterised by a rights-based approach, in the form of a right of appeal for visa refusal, exhaustive grounds for visa refusal, and increasingly clearer and less discretionary rules. 35 However, visa policy remains primarily a security and foreign policy instrument, characterized by weaker human rights constraints than the CEAS and the EU external border control policy. 36 In the context of inter-state solidarity, the 'burden' attached to visa policy is of a different and perhaps less onerous nature than that which characterizes the CEAS, given the resources involved in the reception and integration of refugees, or the EU external border control policy, given its operational aspects often involving the rescuing and reception of irregular migrants. On its part, visa policy, as a policy which straddles the sovereignty sensitive areas of internal security and 
SUPRANATIONAL SOLIDARITY VIS-À-VIS THIRD COUNTRIES
The common visa policy necessarily involves the harmonization of the Member States positions vis-à-vis third countries. This is most evident in relation to the establishment of common 'black' and 'white' lists of, respectively, third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States, and third countries whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, which are contained in the Visa Regulation, and the reciprocity clause in the same Regulation.
HARMONIZATION AND CONDITIONALITY
The Member States' when adopted rules on short-term visas'.
The Visa Regulation was amended in 2014 whereby it now provides in its Article 1:
[t]he purpose of this Regulation is to determine the third countries whose nationals are subject to, or exempt from, the visa requirement, on the basis of a case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating, inter alia, to illegal immigration, public policy and security, economic benefit, in particular in terms of tourism and foreign trade, and the Union's external relations with the relevant third countries, including, in particular, considerations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity. in terms of the specific measures that third countries are expected to adopt, whose implementation is inconsistently and unevenly monitored by the Commission.
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The 2014 changes to the criteria for establishing the common visa lists reflect how visa policy has evolved from a policy which amounted to mutual recognition of national visa restrictions, to a common policy reflecting EU interests and objectives, and a continuous process of balancing tendencies towards exclusion dictated by internal security objectives, with tendencies towards openness. The new reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms is, however, controversial. While the EU is required by the Treaties to foster human rights protection in third countries, and visa policy can be seen as a carrot and stick in this context, the application of the criterion has the practical effect of further penalising third country nationals that are subject to oppressive regimes, and supports the imposition of visas on nationals of refugee-producing countries. In this context, a system of 'target', or 'intelligent' visa sanctions against identified individuals under the Common Foreign and Security Policy could be preferred as more in line with the EU's proclaimed identity. Furthermore, it can be argued that the objective of fostering human rights protection in third countries through the use of visa policy has also served the EU's agenda of externalizing asylum protection.
Generally, the exclusionary focus of the common visa policy has gradually lessened. tenuous. On a cost-benefit assessment, the Member States may be prepared to grant visa facilitation at the most, which has proven not to be a strong enough incentive in some cases. 
THE RECIPROCITY CLAUSE
The reciprocity criterion and clause in the Visa Regulation, according to which a third country whose nationals are visa exempt by the EU is required to reciprocate such a treatment to nationals of all EU Member States, rest on solidarity between the Member States based on reciprocity, their self-interest in the EU's ability to present a unified front and exert leverage externally, and the EU principle of equal treatment of EU nationals. with strategic partners. The Council should ensure that these obligations are carried out in full. 67 Under the new reciprocity clause, the Commission received a number of notifications of nonreciprocity in 2014. 68 While April 2016 marked the deadline for negotiating solutions with the relevant third countries, and non-reciprocity continues with the US and Canada, the Commission has so far declined to suspend EU visa free treatment for nationals of these countries arguing that the suspension would not lead to reciprocity but retaliation with all its negative repercussions on EU citizens, the EU's economy, and its external relations with the countries concerned. 69 While the Council, although invited by the Commission to express its position, has been silent on the issue, the European Parliament has called for the Commission to fulfil its legal obligation to act and has threatened a 'failure to act' procedure. 70 Independently of the Commission's legal obligation to act, the Commission's stance, which it describes as result-oriented and in the 'common' interest, can be criticised. The fact that the EU is not reciprocated by its strategic partners, and the Commission's perceived inaction in this context have an adverse effect on the EU's image and credibility, undermine the principle of equal treatment of EU citizens and make 'speaking with one voice' rhetoric.
Furthermore, the US insistence in dealing bilaterally with the Member States has raised issues with regard to the division of competence between the EU and the Member States in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and, on occasions, has weakened EU leverage vis-à-vis the US in relation to data protection issues. 71 The solidarity crisis in the context of reciprocity shows the limitations of the supranational legal method in the absence of convergence of interests between the Member States in sovereign sensitive areas.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SOLIDARITY ON THE GROUND: LOCAL SCHENGEN COOPERATION AND REPRESENTATION ARRANGEMENTS
The implementation of visa policy remains the responsibility of the Member States through their consular authorities. Implementation of the policy raises a number of challenges for the Member States requiring solidarity. following the examination procedure. 79 Furthermore, as reflected in the Visa Code, the assessment of the individual position of a visa applicant with a view to determining whether there are grounds for visa refusal is necessarily characterised by the exercise of discretion by consular authorities. 80 In such a scenario, it has been observed that there are large differences in the visa issuing practices of EU consulates, 'with some EU countries clearly demonstrating more openness than others'.
Inconsistency in the application of the common rules has a number of negative implications. It may lead to consular shopping. While multiple visa applications can be detected through the VIS, it is submitted that some visa applicants are prepared to change their travel itinerary to be able to lodge their application with the consulate which they consider the most accessible in terms of visa issuing practices and geographical proximity. 82 In the worst case scenario, the inconsistent application of the rules may lead to security deficits undermining the effectiveness of and confidence in the common policy with possible spill-over effects on the frontier-free Schengen area. Furthermore, inconsistency means the unequal treatment of visa applicants and arbitrariness which undermines the EU's image abroad. 83 Finally, the implementation of visa policy involves significant costs and resources.
Although, as mentioned above, the Visa Code establishes an expectation, rather than an obligation, for the Member States to have a consular presence or representation in all third countries or regions of large third countries, when Member States do have a consulate, they come under several obligations in relation to staff, premises and security. 84 With the introduction of the VIS, the Member States are obliged to have in place in their consulates costly equipment for collecting biometric identifiers. 85 This is in a context where the number of visa applications is growing exponentially thus requiring an increase in capacity, although there seems to be a large discrepancy in the demands that Member States face. 86 Thus, a Local Schengen Cooperation Annual Report for China, for example, stated that most Schengen States 'do not feel that they currently have the capacity and resources needed to deal with the consequences of an introduction of biometrics'. 
LOCAL SCHENGEN COOPERATION
While LSC was conceived in the 1990s as a relatively marginal and voluntary intergovernmental mechanism whose coordination was undertaken by the EU Presidency, it has become, under the Visa Code, increasingly structured, with the Commission assuming a coordinating role exercised via the EU Delegations. 90 The concrete operational tasks that LSC is supposed to achieve are a harmonised application of the rules contained in the Visa Code taking into consideration local circumstances, and the exchange of information on various issues including statistics on visas and migratory and security risks.
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In relation to the first task, as mentioned above, States agree to carry out bilateral talks with the MFA 'but simultaneously want the EU Del to keep coordinating and monitoring this issue, not least since there is a risk that Schengen States will be played out against each other unless coordination is in place'. openness and restriction and foster solidarity, including a visa liberalisation process towards candidate and Eastern Partnership countries accompanied by the safeguard clause in the Visa Regulation. Still, this approach has also attracted criticism in relation to human rights protection on the ground that it serves the EU's strategy of externalisation of protection and migration management through cooperation with third countries. It remains, however, unlikely that the EU will extensively use visa policy in support of such an externalisation strategy in the future.
CONSULAR REPRESENTATION
In the process of policy harmonization, the reciprocity mechanism has proven particularly problematic. The continuing lack of reciprocity between some Member States and the US and Canada has led to a solidarity crisis in visa policy. There is no agreement, either between the Member States or the EU institutions, as to what solidarity should mean in the context of reciprocity, essentially as a result of lack of convergence of interests between the Member States. The lack of agreement finds reflection in the various amendments to the reciprocity clause, its wording and the inter-institutional dispute as to its legal interpretation.
The Commission pursues an interpretation of solidarity described as result-oriented and in the 'common' interest, where common means majority. The European Parliament pursues a more principled approach, which could also be seen in the common interest. If the European Parliament proceeds with a failure to act action against the Commission, as it has threatened, the hot potato will eventually fall in the hands of the Council acting by qualified majority which has so far been silent. If anything, the reciprocity crisis shows the limitations of the supranational legal method in the absence of convergence of interests in sovereign sensitive areas.
Solidarity is also key for the effective implementation of the common visa policy on the ground. In this context, solidarity remains essentially intergovernmental in nature. It has mostly taken the form of LSC and representation agreements between the Member States, which find their legal bases in the Visa Code. It is strongly functionally driven and has been progressively informed by EU norms and procedures. Still, Commission attempts to push solidarity forward for the sake of effectiveness, in the form for example of a system of 'mandatory' representation have encountered strong opposition from the Member States.
